Fortune
Inside the world’s biggest hedge fund
Thursday March 19, 5:50 am ET
By Brian O’Keefe, senior editor

Is the current downturn merely a severe slump, or are we facing a second coming of the Great Depression? That’s the question everyone is asking these days. But Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates and manager of what is now the world’s biggest hedge fund, has been preparing to answer it for eight years.

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In 2001 he had his investment team build a “depression gauge” into the firm’s computer system, line by line in the code, to adjust the portfolio’s strategy and risk profile if the economy ever entered a massive deleveraging period – the kind of multiyear process that ricocheted through the world economy in the 1930s and that has eviscerated markets periodically through the ages.

On Sept. 30 of last year, just a couple of weeks after the failure of Lehman Brothers, Dalio logged into his system and saw that the computer had flipped the switch. Bridgewater’s black box is now operating on high alert.

Yet even as he is preparing his clients to hunker down for something different and more challenging than a typical recession, Dalio still expects his fund to thrive. Because his approach doesn’t depend on the direction of any particular market, he explains matter-of-factly, there is no reason that he shouldn’t continue to find as many good investment opportunities as he always has. Considering what he sees coming, that’s a pretty bold statement.

In normal times we might be writing about Ray Dalio, 59, simply because he’s one of the world’s most successful investors. Since starting Bridgewater Associates out of an extra bedroom in his Upper East Side Manhattan apartment in 1975, Dalio (pronounced Dally-o) has built the firm into a powerhouse managing some $80 billion. With a personal fortune estimated at more than $4 billion, he ranks as one of the wealthiest residents even in money-soaked Greenwich, Conn.

More impressively, for the past 18 years his flagship hedge fund, Pure Alpha, which now holds more than $38 billion, has averaged an annual return of 15% before fees – gliding through the Asian flu of the 1990s, the dotcom implosion, the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the current worldwide financial crisis without ever suffering an annual loss greater than 2%. Last year, when 70% of hedge funds lost money and the average fund fell 18%, Pure Alpha generated a gross return of 14%.

But these are not normal times. And what makes Dalio compelling is not just his track record but the way he goes about making money, and the rigorous analysis he applies to understanding markets, organizations, the economy, and life.

Does Dalio think of himself as one of the world’s great investors? “No,” he says, shaking his head, visibly agitated. “First of all, I don’t know what the definition is of ‘one of the great investors.’ It’s a totally irrelevant question. I have the fear of messing up. And that fear drives me to ask, ‘Well, could this thing happen? Could that thing happen? If it happened in Japan, how do I know it won’t happen to me?’”

Dalio describes himself as a “hyperrealist,” in the sense that he is driven to understand the processes that govern the way the world really works, without bringing subjective value judgments into the equation. “I think the thing that makes him different is an intolerance for the inadequate answer,” says Bob Prince, 50, Bridgewater’s co-chief investment officer, who’s been with the firm since 1986. “He’ll just keep peeling back layer after layer to get at the essential truth.”

In every activity in his life – from managing his firm to stalking a wart hog on a bow-hunting trip – Dalio believes in applying a carefully thought-out process to get the results he wants. That’s especially true in making investment decisions. “I’m very big on having clarified principles,” he says. “I don’t believe in being reactive. You can’t do that in the markets effectively. I can’t. I need perspective. I need a game plan.” To develop one, he stress-tests strategies through computer simulation across time and around the world to make sure that they’re “timeless and universal.” It’s all about cautious – and highly educated – wagering on probabilities.

During the long boom, many hedge fund managers earned billions on big leveraged bets that stocks would rise; later, a handful made fortunes by anticipating the bust. That not Dalio’s style. (In fact, he hates being called a hedge fund manager.) For one thing, he doesn’t magnify his bets with a lot of borrowed money – his leverage ratio is about 4 to 1, far less than other investors have used.

Like fellow quant-minded managers D.E. Shaw or Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies, Dalio translates his insights into algorithms and then has a powerful computer system scour dozens of markets around the world looking for mispriced assets and other opportunities. Rather than focusing only on stocks and searching for Peter Lynch’s proverbial “10-bagger,” Dalio and his computers concentrate heavily on the currency and fixed-income markets, grinding out consistent singles, doubles, and occasional triples. That approach, as we’ve seen, can be very rewarding.

Understanding the ‘D-process’

Bridgewater’s main office is an unobtrusive, three-story stone and glass building that sits on 22 acres of heavily wooded land in Westport, Conn., some 20 miles up the coast from Greenwich. The firm has added space in three other buildings around the area as the explosive growth in its assets under management – averaging more than 40% annually for the past 10 years – has necessitated a similar investment in new employees and technological capacity. Since 2000 its headcount has grown from just under 100 to about 800, with more than 100 people in its client services division alone.

Unlike a typical hedge fund, Bridgewater does not manage money for wealthy individuals. Rather, it works only with large institutions like pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. Right now the firm has 270 clients, about half in the U.S. and half overseas. Like a standard hedge fund, it charges a management fee of 2% of assets and 20% of profits.

But its relationship with its investors consists of much more than taking a cut of their money. Bridgewater’s army of analysts provides clients with a stream of research. “I love their daily economic report,” says Loews Corp. CEO Jim Tisch. “For me it’s a must-read.” And the analysts are always on call to perform custom jobs or offer a portfolio critique – even of allocations to other hedge funds. “I view them more as a partner than a vendor,” says John Lane, the director of Eastman Kodak’s $7.5 billion pension portfolio, which has had money with the firm since the late 1980s. “We don’t make a major change here in strategy without calling Bridgewater to get their view.”

The money-management industry has been battered by scandal and failures lately, but Lane has complete confidence in Bridgewater. “Of all the investment firms we work with,” he says, “they’re the most trusted.” Asked head-on about the trust issue, Dalio points out that outside custodians hold customers’ money and that his institutional clients aggressively audit Bridgewater’s operations.

Dalio, a sturdy six-footer who favors open-collar cotton shirts and corduroys when he’s not meeting with clients, works out of an unostentatious office brimming with photos of his wife and four children and has a view of the Saugatuck River, which flows through the property. The rustic feel of his surroundings pleases him. A member of the board of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, he’s an avid fisherman and bow hunter who has gone after everything from Cape buffaloes to wild boars. He says that his attraction to outdoor activities – he also enjoys snowboarding – is primarily a manifestation of his appreciation for the beauty and sophistication of nature. By comparison, he says, “anything that man sees or does is overly simplistic.”

To maintain his mental energy and creativity, Dalio meditates about five times a week for 20 minutes, a practice he says he adopted when “the Beatles started doing it in 1968.” He is also a rabid music fan with omnivorous tastes. He keeps a box at the opera in New York City, makes an annual trek to New Orleans for Jazzfest, regularly goes salsa dancing with his wife, and has a passion for the blues.

Like many billionaire money managers, Dalio has his own charitable foundation. For the past three years, he’s funded newspaper and radio ads supporting a campaign called “Let’s Redefine Christmas,” which challenged people to give donations to charities as gifts instead of indulging in the holiday ritual of conspicuous consumption.

Although Dalio says he is not a particularly big reader, these days his desk is piled high with some 20-odd books on economic debacles, such as “Essays on the Great Depression” by Ben Bernanke and “The Great Crash of 1929″ by John Kenneth Galbraith. Inside each are Post-it notes and hand-scribbled thoughts in the margins. He also keeps close at hand a binder he’s put together with detailed, 100-page timelines of the four major deleveraging episodes of the past century – the hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic in the 1920s, the worldwide crash during the Great Depression in the 1930s, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, and Japan’s lost decade of the 1990s. He says the timelines provide “a virtual experience of what it would be like to trade through each scenario.”

Out of those four historical examples, Dalio says that our current situation most closely resembles the Great Depression because of the global breadth of the problems. But he doesn’t like to use the term “depression.” He thinks it’s too scary, evoking as it does images of hobos and Hoovervilles, and distracts people from focusing on the mechanics of what is going on. He prefers to use a term he coined: “D-process.”

Most people, says Dalio, think that a depression is simply a really, really bad recession. But in reality, the two are distinct, naturally occurring events. A recession is a contraction in real GDP brought on by a central bank tightening monetary policy, usually to control inflation, and ends when the central bank eases. But a D-process occurs when an economy has an unsustainably high debt burden and monetary policy ceases to be effective, usually because interest rates are close to zero, and the central bank has no way to stimulate the economy. To compensate, the value of debt must be written down (risking deflation) or the central bank must print money (a trigger of inflation), or some combination of both.

In recent years the level of debt as a percentage of GDP in the U.S. has skyrocketed past previous highs last seen in the early 1930s. And the Federal Reserve’s benchmark rate is now hovering just above zero. To Dalio, therefore, it’s clear that a D-process is under way. “It seems very likely that stocks will get materially cheaper,” he says. “We have to go through an important debt restructuring process, and a lot of assets are going to be for sale, huge numbers of assets. And there’s going to be a shortage of buyers.”

Even investors in most hedge funds won’t be immune. According to research by Bridgewater, the hedge fund industry in aggregate is 75% correlated to the S&P 500, an issue on which Dalio has been sounding an alarm for a couple of years now. “Too many people have a systematic bias toward positive economic growth,” he says. “I think that what we’re going to probably have is an economy that’s going to get worse, with most people positioned for it to be better.” By the end of the D-process, he expects that the reverse may well be the case.

Alpha returns

Dalio grew up in suburban Long Island, N.Y., the only child of a jazz musician and a homemaker. Unlike his father, who played clarinet, piccolo, flute, and sax, Dalio never had the patience to learn an instrument. As a boy in the early 1960s, he caddied at a nearby golf course. The stock market was booming at the time and, at age 12, Dalio heard enough hot tips that he decided he wanted to get in on the action, so he went to see his father’s broker. When his first purchase, Northeast Airlines, took off, he was hooked.

After attending Long Island University, he got an MBA at Harvard, spent a year as the director of commodities trading at brokerage Dominick & Dominick, and ended up working under Sandy Weill at CBWL Hayden Stone, where his job was to help businesses hedge their market risks using futures. After a year he struck out on his own as a consultant, helping companies hedge interest rate and currency risk. On the side, he invested his own money and began to accumulate trading “decision rules” – at first jotted down on notebooks, later stored on computers – that could be back-tested to see whether they worked in different eras and markets. In the mid-1980s, he parlayed his reputation for quality research into a chance to manage $5 million of fixed-income money for the World Bank, and produced spectacular returns. He launched his hedge fund portfolio in 1990 with money from Loews Corp. and Kodak.

It’s no accident that Bridgewater’s flagship fund is called Pure Alpha. The name reflects Dalio’s commitment to an approach to investing – “portable alpha,” or the separation of so-called alpha and beta – that was innovative when he started but is commonplace today in the wonkier corridors of Wall Street. “Ray Dalio recognized that the traditional model of portfolio construction was too constrained,” says Angelo Calvello, a former executive at State Street Global Advisers and Man Investments and the author of a number of publications on portable alpha. “He really changed the way that people thought about investing and allocating risk.”

In investing terms, beta is the passive return that a portfolio might get from the ups and downs of a benchmark such as the S&P 500 stock index. Alpha is the measure of a manager’s return, with the same risk, in excess of the beta. For his own fund, Dalio devised an “alpha overlay” approach that allowed him to allocate a certain amount of capital to replicate an investor’s chosen benchmark and then roam free among other asset classes looking for the best possible “alpha streams,” or return opportunities. It was the perfect way to employ the trading formulas he had been accumulating over the years.

Then, Dalio says without irony, he discovered the holy grail of investing, “by which I mean that if you find this thing you will be rich and successful in investing.” This grail is not, unfortunately, a talisman that a regular person might stumble on, but a formula: 15 or more uncorrelated return streams, either betas or alphas. According to Dalio, such a portfolio reduces risk by 80%.

The tricky part, of course, is finding a large number of reliable, uncorrelated, moneymaking sources of alpha in the first place. (If it were easy, everyone would do it). And it requires venturing far beyond the bounds of equities. Today, Bridgewater’s computers scan the world for opportunities in roughly 100 different categories, ranging from directional bets on the price of industrial metals to relative bets on pairs of emerging market countries’ interest rates. Having the fund so widely diversified reduces the risk of a major blowup – and it limits the impact that Pure Alpha can have on any one market.

Bridgewater’s confidence in the Pure Alpha system is so great that a couple of years ago Dalio did something rare on Wall Street – turn away money. By the end of 2005, Dalio and his team felt that they were reaching the limits of their investment capacity. They decided it was time to stop taking new accounts and focus exclusively on their best strategy. Much of the money they were managing was segregated into portfolios for, say, global bond exposure using a more traditional approach, rather than Pure Alpha. So they gave their clients the opportunity to either transfer their money to Pure Alpha or withdraw it, if the portable alpha approach didn’t fit their institutional mandate.

In the end Bridgewater did lose a few clients but created room to add more money from its existing ones. These days, in addition to the $38.6 billion in the Pure Alpha fund, Bridgewater has $17.9 billion in a portfolio called All-Weather, which Dalio originally created for his family trust. All-Weather is a “passive” fund designed to provide a long-term return comparable to that of a 60/40 mix of stocks and bonds, but with less risk (last year it was down 20%). For investors willing to take more risk, there is also a Pure Alpha II fund that makes the exact same bets as the flagship but with half again as much volatility.

‘Either a cult… or the happiest place on earth’

A couple of years ago, Dalio surveyed his rapidly growing firm and decided that he needed to codify his value system so that there would be a model for working and managing the Bridgewater way. So he sat down to write an outline of his principles. The result is an extraordinary 62-page document that every employee is required to study. (Sample tidbit: “At Bridgewater people have to value getting at the truth so badly that they are willing to humiliate themselves to get it.”)

“If you took five organizational psychologists, locked them in a room, and told them to create the perfect blueprint for a corporate culture, this is about what they would come up with,” says Bob Eichinger, a retired consultant who has spent five decades working with companies on how to manage talent and now works part-time for Bridgewater. “He’s trying to design a culture in which people with talent have the freedom to perform.”

The result of that design feels pretty radical compared with the typical corporate environment. In keeping with his identity as a hyperrealist, Dalio is committed to total transparency. So, for instance, every meeting is taped and kept on file. Blunt and frequent feedback is required, including “drill-down” sessions that probe into why employees failed at tasks. Managers aren’t allowed to evaluate an employee’s performance unless he or she is present. Because Dalio believes mistakes are valuable learning tools, every time something goes wrong employees are required to file a memo in the so-called Issues Log. And because Dalio is passionate about the meritocracy of ideas, subordinates are encouraged to argue with their superiors – and the superiors are required to encourage it. “We hate egos,” he says.

If young employees – and loads of recent Ivy League grads with 99th-percentile SAT scores roam the halls – need a reminder of the potential opportunity afforded by that meritocracy, they need look no further than Greg Jensen, 34, the head of research and the third voice, along with Dalio and Prince, in the firm’s weekly investment strategy meetings. Jensen started at Bridgewater as an intern directly out of Dartmouth and rose quickly through the ranks. “I love that your contribution here gets evaluated on a logical, principled basis rather than through the prism of a power base,” he says.

Not surprisingly, the intense culture is not for everybody. “It’s either a cult with mind control or the happiest place on earth, depending on whether you buy into it,” says one former employee. Even some happy current employees say that there was an initial adjustment period and admitted that aggressively candid feedback wasn’t always fun. But several spoke of how empowering such an open approach can be, and a few even offered testimonials for how embracing a policy of radical clarity had improved their personal lives.

More to the point, perhaps, is the fact that Dalio’s system gives him the results he’s looking for. He says he is perfectly comfortable having his assertions challenged at all times. In fact, he craves it. “I draw my conclusions,” he says, “and I say, ‘Please shoot holes in this. Tell me where I’m wrong.’ People tend to think that my success, or whatever you want to call it, has been because I’m a really good decision-maker. I think it is actually because I’m less confident in making decisions. So in other words, I never know anything really. Everything is a probability.”

And that’s what keeps him alert to ever-changing conditions. “If I had to make lots of long-term bets, my track record would be much worse than it is,” he says. “The beauty of my position is that I have the ability to change my mind tomorrow.”[]

pratolo.com
Jadi kita ketemu sebenarnya tgl 8 apa 9 ya?
Soalnya nanti akan mempengaruhi probabilitas pertemuan kita

pratolo.com
Haaa..ya yang dulu itu sekelas sama Joko Waluyo dan suka duduk disampingnya.
Yg jelas bukan pacarnya Joko, karena Joko lelaki normal

Jim Rogers Doesn’t Mince Words About the Crisis
Maria Bartiromo talks to global investor Jim Rogers (BusinessWeek February 26, 2009, 5:00PM EST)

In 1970 a young Wall Streeter named Jim Rogers hooked up with George Soros to start the legendary Quantum Fund. The ensuing decades have seen Rogers build an iconoclastic career as an author, adventurer, and creator of the Rogers International Commodities Index. And throughout, Rogers—now based in Singapore—has remained an outspoken global investor. Today is no different. He has harsh words for former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, suggests President Barack Obama and his economic team are not up to the task, and thinks tough love is the answer for America.

MARIA BARTIROMO: What do you think of the government’s response to the economic crisis?

JIM ROGERS:
Terrible. They’re making it worse. It’s pretty embarrassing for President Obama, who doesn’t seem to have a clue what’s going on—which would make sense from his background. And he has hired people who are part of the problem. [Treasury Secretary Tim] Geithner was head of the New York Fed, which was supposedly in charge of Wall Street and the banks more than anybody else. And as you remember, [Obama's chief economic adviser, Larry] Summers helped bail out Long-Term Capital Management years ago. These are people who think the only solution is to save their friends on Wall Street rather than to save 300 million Americans.

So what should they be doing?

What would I like to see happen? I’d like to see them let these people go bankrupt, let the bankrupt go bankrupt, stop bailing them out. There are plenty of banks in America that saw this coming, that kept their powder dry and have been waiting for the opportunity to go in and take over the assets of the incompetent. Likewise, many, many homeowners didn’t go out and buy five homes with no income. Many homeowners have been waiting for this, and now all of a sudden the government is saying: “Well, too bad for you. We don’t care if you did it right or not, we’re going to bail out the 100,000 or 200,000 who did it wrong.” I mean, this is outrageous economics, and it’s terrible morality.

You have said Bear Stearns and Lehman (LEHMQ) would still be around if Greenspan hadn’t bailed out Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Can you explain?

Well, if Long-Term Capital Management had been allowed to fail, Lehman and the rest of them would’ve lost a huge amount of money, their capital would’ve been impaired, and it would’ve put a terrible crimp on Wall Street. It would’ve slowed them down for years. Instead of losing capital, losing assets, and losing incompetent people, they hired more incompetent people.

Should AIG (AIG) have been allowed to fail, too?

First of all, banks and investment banks and insurance companies have been failing for hundreds of years. Yes, we would’ve had a terrible two years. But you’re dragging out the pain. We had 10 years of the worst credit excesses in world history. You don’t wipe out something like that in six months or a year by saying: “Oh, now let’s wake up and start over again.”

What about Citigroup (C)? What about the car companies?

They should be allowed to go bankrupt. Why should American taxpayers put up billions to save a few car companies? They made the mistakes! We didn’t make the mistakes! I’m sure they’ll give them the money, but I’m telling you, it’s a mistake. It’s a horrible mistake.

I totally understand what you’re saying, but the banks are under massive pressure.

They all took huge, huge profits. Who was the head of Citigroup? Chuck Prince? I mean, how many hundreds of millions of dollars did Prince take out of the company? How many hundreds of millions of dollars did other Citibank execs take out of the company? Wall Street has paid something like $40 billion or $50 billion in bonuses in the past decade. Who was that guy who was the head of Merrill Lynch (MERR)?

Stan O’Neal?

Right, Stan O’Neal. He got $150 million for leaving, even though he ruined the company. Look at the guy at Fannie Mae (FNM), Franklin Raines. He did worse accounting than Enron. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FRE) alone did nothing but pure fraudulent accounting year after year, and yet that guy’s walking around with millions of dollars. What the hell kind of system is this?

Are you worried the economic crisis will lead to political turmoil in China and elsewhere?

I absolutely am. We’re going to have social unrest in much of the world. America won’t be immune.

What does all this mean from an investment standpoint?

Always in the past, when people have printed huge amounts of money or spent money they didn’t have, it has led to higher inflation and higher prices. In my view, that’s certainly going to happen again this time. Oil prices are down at the moment, but that’s temporary. And you’re going to see higher prices, especially of commodities, because the fundamentals of commodities are enhanced by what’s happening.

Which commodities are worth buying or holding on to?

I recently bought more of all of them. But I really think agriculture is going to be the best place to be. Agriculture’s been a horrible business for 30 years. For decades the money shufflers, the paper shufflers, have been the captains of the universe. That is now changing. The people who produce real things [will be on top]. You’re going to see stockbrokers driving taxis. The smart ones will learn to drive tractors, because they’ll be working for the farmers. It’s going to be the 29-year-old farmers who have the Lamborghinis. So you should find yourself a nice farmer and hook up with him or her, because that’s where the money’s going to be in the next couple of decades. []

Economists Rush to Disagree About Crisis Solutions
Some economists say the stimulus plan will only make things worse. Others admit they don’t know the right course

By Peter Coy (Businessweek March 8, 2009, 9:52PM EST)

If the U.S. economy is a sick patient on the operating table, then economists are angry surgeons fighting for control of the scalpel and accusing one another of gross incompetence.

It’s bad enough that few economists predicted how bad things would get. What’s worse is that even now the profession is foggy and conflicted about how to get out of this mess. That’s distressing, to say the least, given the government report on Mar. 6 that the economy lost 651,000 jobs in February. The unemployment rate shot up to 8.1%, its highest since 1983.

The main thing economists are battling over is whether the U.S. economy needs a large jolt of government spending. Those who think so—probably a majority—say the economy is at risk of sinking into a self-sustaining spiral, where a drop-off in consumer spending forces companies to cut jobs, leading to further cutbacks by consumers, and so on into a deeper hole.
A Keynesian “Dangerous Spiral?”

But a vociferous contingent of economists says that deficit spending by the government would only make matters worse. Many of them argue that the economy is going through a healthy and necessary “reset” in which spending, investment, and stock prices are being adjusted downward to reflect a lower and more sensible reassessment of long-term growth expectations.

So, which are we experiencing—a dangerous spiral or a necessary reset? Most of the economists in the “dangerous spiral” camp agree more or less with the late British economist John Maynard Keynes, who warned that economies can get stuck in a trough of insufficient demand for goods and services. He advocated fighting the Great Depression by using government spending to lift demand.

Today a majority of academic and professional economists buy into at least some of what Keynes had to say. For example, a Wall Street Journal (NWS) survey in February of 52 economists concluded that job losses over the next year would be about a million greater without the Obama stimulus plan than with it. In a Mar. 6 interview with BusinessWeek, Nariman Behravesh, chief economist of IHS Global Insight, a widely followed forecasting outfit, said that “the fiscal stimulus is fine in the sense that it’s big and fairly bold.” If anything, he said, it should be bigger and start working sooner.
Contempt for Paul Krugman

But that view is hardly unanimous. In late January The New York Times (NYT) published a full-page ad signed by about 250 economists, including Nobel laureates and other luminaries, slamming the Obama plan and saying, “Notwithstanding reports that all economists are now Keynesians… we the undersigned do not believe that more government spending is a way to improve economic performance.”

These days some of the anti-Keynesians barely recognize the Keynesians’ existence. In an interview on Mar. 6, one of the signers of the New York Times’ open letter, Nobel laureate Edward Prescott of Arizona State University’s W.P. Carey School of Business, argued that “no respectable macroeconomist” believes stimulus works. Prescott said 2008 Nobelist Paul Krugman, the Princeton University professor and Times columnist who advocates stimulus, “doesn’t command respect in the profession.” Prescott argues that what the economy really needs is tax cuts and a commitment to increase productivity, in part by eliminating wasteful regulation. Of Obama, he says: “His policies are designed to depress the economy and are depressing the economy.”

The squabbling is embarrassing to the economics profession, which likes to see itself as a true science with consistent axioms and verifiable claims. In the inaugural issue of the American Economic Assn.’s Macroeconomics journal published earlier this year, Columbia University economist Michael Woodford asserted, “Has there been a convergence of views in macroeconomics? Of course…”

What to make of “Systemic Failure?”

The fact is that it’s hard to see much evidence of “convergence” in the policy debates. Paul Willmott, a specialist in quantitative finance, wrote in a Jan. 1 blog post that where economists go wrong is in trying to construct an intellectual edifice out of crumbly material. Willmott blasted former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for arriving belatedly at the conclusion that the world does not work as neatly as the textbooks say. “Ohmigod!” Willmott wrote. “His naivety [sic] and lack of self-knowledge is staggering.…The edifice of nonsense has collapsed on top of one of its builders.”

Economists naturally don’t like being accused of cluelessness. David S. Evans, vice-chairman of LECG Europe (XPRT), an economic consulting firm, says economists can’t be blamed for being befuddled by the current crisis because “we’re looking at a systemic failure that’s very different from what we’ve seen before.” He said, “It’s kind of like AIDS in a sense. It all of a sudden hits. You don’t know where it came from or how to treat it.”

Duke University economist Campbell Harvey says that given the inherent imprecision in social sciences, it’s not so bad that economists disagree. “I think it’s a good thing that there are arguments,” Harvey said. “We hope that policymakers listen to the debate and make the right choices.”

Lack of Liquidity Came as a Shock

OK. But if all that economists can do is offer policymakers a range of conflicting choices, it’s not clear how much they’re contributing to the debate. Willem Buiter, a professor at the London School of Economics and former Bank of England policymaker, wrote in a February blog that modern macroeconomics—meaning not just the Keynesian side but the monetarist side as well—was caught completely off-guard by the drying up of liquidity in financial markets and lending.

It’s clear by now that mainstream economists deserve part of the blame for the mess we’re in now—along with Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, lawmakers, Presidents, ratings agencies, mortgage bankers, appraisers, and journalists, among others. The so-called dismal science is showing at least some signs of humility. Buiter says approvingly that the Bank of England “has by now shed the conventional wisdom of the typical macroeconomics training of the past few decades.” What’s replacing it, he says, is not a bold new concept of how the economy works, but “an intellectual potpourri of factoids, partial theories, empirical regularities without firm theoretical foundations, hunches, intuitions and half-developed insights.” That, Buiter says, “is not much, but knowing that you know nothing is the beginning of wisdom.” []